(Natural News)—The vast and mysterious networks of tunnels in Gaza dug through the years by the militant group Hamas pose a significant challenge for Israel.
The risk of getting bogged down in urban warfare and in Hamas’s tunnel systems has forced Israel to repeatedly postpone its ground offensive on Gaza, with fears rising that such a scenario could damage the prestige of the the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
Over the past week, prominent retired American officials have warned Israel against initiating a big ground offensive in Gaza, including retired Army Gen. David Petraeus, who warned that IDF forces could be going into “a very, very tough fight.” He added that the tunnels might have rooms with improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Bradley Bowman, a security analyst based in Washington, said the tunnels could hide enemy forces from soldiers traveling “across the field or into the outskirts of the city.”
IDF spokesman Jonathan Conricus conceded that eliminating Hamas would not be easy because Hamas has efficiently “embedded itself inside and underneath the Gaza Strip,” and that the group has previously utilized its maze of tunnels to stop enemy weapons and hide rockets.
John Spencer, a West Point Modern War Institute expert, said the Hamas tunnel systems are a “nightmare” and that there is currently no solution to the obstacle Israeli forces may face if and when Tel Aviv decides to launch a land operation.
Meanwhile, the tunnels can allow Hamas to carry out surprise attacks against advancing enemy forces, with militants infiltrating behind enemy lines and causing havoc on rearward-facing units with snipers, anti-tank guns and RPG-armed troops. The tunnels can also be used by special small hunter-killer teams to target military forces and evade counterattacks when facing against Israeli troops.
Israeli soldiers pursuing Hamas into the tunnels could also face several time-consuming and hazardous challenges since navigation and communications equipment, along with night vision goggles that depend on ambient light, would not function. Spencer added that in the Gaza tunnels, a lone Hamas defender can take his place in a narrow tunnel and face off against a superior force.
Outside of the tunnels, Petraeus warned that soldiers may still have to clear every building, home and basement in Gaza before being able to push deeper into the Strip.
IDF commanders wary of Hamas fighters
IDF commanders are also wary of the challenges they would face in ensuring battlefield superiority against the estimated 30,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza’s dense urban environment, much of which has already been reduced to rubble, which could be used for ambushes and snipers’ nests from Israeli airstrikes. This could also explain Israeli reluctance about a ground-based operation inside Gaza. (Related: 9 UN workers killed as Gaza Strip suffers from unrelenting Israeli airstrikes.)
In an analysis, the Modern War Institute at West Point said that defenders often hold the advantage in urban conflict.
The paper highlighted that “the advantages provided to a weaker force to occupy urban terrain are great.” A weaker enemy can use the physical terrain for concealment and cover both to fight from and to maneuver.
Tunneling has been a common tactic used by Hamas to smuggle supplies and equipment across the heavily guarded border encircling Gaza for decades. Experts believe that their methods have now advanced to the point where they can now build entire underground networks to quickly move and evacuate fighters and equipment, control underground command posts and operate workshops for the manufacture of weapons.
In 2018, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, claimed that the Hamas tunnel network in Gaza was twice as large as the Cu Chi tunnels the Viet Cong excavated beneath Saigon during the U.S. War in Vietnam.
Hamas’ tunneling initiatives through the Gaza Strip have been significantly revealed in detailed maps based on IDF data. Israeli forces reported that there were at least 100 kilometers (62 miles) of underground tunnels during the 2014 Gaza War.
Additionally, Hamas boasted that it had constructed tunnels with a combined length of at least 500 kilometers (310 miles) in 2021.
Go to WWIII.news for more updates about the Israel-Hamas conflict. Watch the video below for a review of Gaza’s place in Jewish history and the present.
This video is from the Gabe Mondragon channel on Brighteon.com.
More related stories:
- Hezbollah threat in the north delays Israel invasion of Gaza.
- GENOCIDAL: Israeli lawmaker demands deployment of “Doomsday” weapons to annihilate Gaza.
- Israeli military gets “green light” to enter Gaza and begin ground offensive.
Sources include:
Two Storms, One Harvest
Every food crisis in living memory has been a one-shock event. The 2008 price spike was a commodity bubble. The 2020 shortages were a logistics failure. The 2022 grain scare was a war on one exporter’s ports. Each time, the system bent, adjusted, and recovered, and each time the experts assured us afterward that global markets are simply too big and too diversified to fail.
What nobody in Washington seems eager to discuss is that 2026 is shaping up to be something the modern food system has never actually faced. Two independent shocks, one climatic and one geopolitical, are converging on the same harvest cycle at the same time. Not sequentially. Simultaneously.
Start with the weather. The Pacific Ocean is currently building toward what forecasters now openly call a record event. NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center puts the odds of at least a strong El Niño near 88 percent, with roughly two in three odds it reaches “very strong” status, the tier reserved for perhaps three or four events in the entire satellite era. Every major global model now projects a median peak in Super El Niño territory, and most of them project it exceeding the 2015-16 event, which until now held the modern record. Sea surface anomalies were already brushing the super threshold in mid-July, months before these events normally peak. The atmosphere has already shifted into El Niño mode, and the event is forecast to crest in late fall and early winter.
This is not about “climate change.” It’s about the standard cycles of weather, and the cycle we’re currently in is one that has likely devastated societies in the past. We’re better prepared as a society today, but not all Americans are equally prepared.
Serious households have started doing the quiet math on their own. Grocery bills tell part of the story, and the forecast maps tell the rest, which is why long-term food storage has moved from fringe hobby to mainstream line item in the family budget, with established suppliers like Heaven’s Harvest seeing demand from people who five years ago would have rolled their eyes at the idea. That instinct is not paranoia. It is pattern recognition, and the pattern is worth walking through carefully.
Editor’s Note: Heaven’s Harvest IS a sponsor, but the warnings of this article are real and would be written even if we didn’t have a survival food sponsor. With that said, those who take advantage of what they offer can use promo code “Patriot” for 15% off.
The Fertilizer Clock Is Already Running
While the Pacific warms, the second shock has been unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz. The conflict with Iran turned the world’s most important energy chokepoint into a contested waterway, and the consequences reach far beyond the gas pump. Roughly a third of global fertilizer trade moves through Hormuz, and the disruption sent urea prices up 86 percent year over year by March, with a 53 percent jump in a single month.
The World Bank projects energy prices rising about 24 percent in 2026 and fertilizer about 31 percent. By its own accounting, fertilizer prices ran 35 percent higher in the first five months of this year than the same period last year.
Here is the mechanism the nightly news will not explain. Fertilizer is not a grocery item. It is a time-delayed input. The nitrogen a farmer in Iowa or Punjab could not afford to apply this spring does not show up as a problem this spring. It shows up as a thinner harvest six to twelve months later.
The World Bank’s own food security brief concedes that the effects of reduced applications earlier this season “are likely to become visible only later in harvest outcomes.” Translate that from institutional language into plain English and it means this. The damage is already done, it is already in the ground, and we are simply waiting for it to arrive on the shelf.
Now check the calendar. Six to twelve months from the spring planting season lands us squarely in late 2026 and early 2027. Which is precisely when the strongest El Niño in the instrumental record is forecast to peak, bringing its signature droughts to Southeast Asia, Australia, southern Africa, northern Brazil, and South Asia, the very regions that grow the world’s rice, sugar, and oilseeds.
The World Bank warns openly that a strong El Niño “could disrupt multiple crop belts simultaneously” on top of the conflict-driven input costs. Their baseline projection assumes the Middle East disruptions ease by autumn. What in the last two years of Middle East history suggests that assumption is safe?
The System Has No Slack Left
The comfortable answer is that global markets always adjust. But adjustment requires slack, and the slack is gone. Global cereal production is expected to decline from last year’s records even before El Niño does its work. The UN World Food Programme, hardly a den of right-wing preppers, is calling this the most significant disruption to its supply chains since Covid and the invasion of Ukraine, and its supply chain director put the stakes bluntly.
Today’s supply chain challenges are tomorrow’s hunger crisis.
There is also a political dimension that markets cannot price. When food gets scarce, governments do not behave like economists. They behave like politicians. Export bans, hoarding mandates, and panic buying at the national level turned the modest rice shortfall of 2008 into a global crisis, and analysts are already warning that import-dependent nations are the first dominoes.
The 2015-16 Super El Niño, a far weaker event than what is now forecast, threw tens of millions into food stress across Africa and Asia. This one is projected to be stronger, and it arrives with fertilizer already rationed by price and shipping lanes already contested by missiles.
What Joseph Knew
Scripture does not treat preparation for lean years as faithlessness. It treats it as wisdom delivered in advance to those willing to act on it.
Behold, there come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of Egypt: And there shall arise after them seven years of famine; and all the plenty shall be forgotten in the land of Egypt.
Joseph did not respond to that warning with a hashtag or a committee. He stored grain during the years of abundance, and when the famine came, Egypt stood while its neighbors begged. The lesson is not that famine is certain. It is that the time to prepare is precisely when preparation still looks optional.
Nobody who filled a pantry in a year of plenty has ever regretted it, and nobody standing in an empty aisle has ever been glad he waited for certainty.
None of this calls for panic, and panic is the enemy of sound judgment anyway. It calls for the same unglamorous prudence our grandparents considered ordinary. Keep some cash margin, know your local growers, and put real food in deep storage while it is cheap and available, because the entire arc of this story is that cheap and available is a closing window.
Families looking for a straightforward place to start can visit Heaven’s Harvest and use promo code Patriot for 15 percent off long-term storable food. The forecasts may yet soften, the strait may yet reopen, and we should pray they do. But hope is a fine thing to hold and a foolish thing to eat.






You drop a couple of thermobaric bombs in separate entrances it will end hamas. If they did not build concrete supports only small areas would have collapsed. This will affect miles of tunnels. It is gruesome anyway you do it.
How about a couple of industrial-power fans blowing tear gas or something a bit more potent into an opening and marked with a color dye at multiple entrances, so that the IDF can easily see smoke rising out of multiple locations. Wash, rinse and repeat.