(Schiff)—Rampant government spending continues to mask fundamental weaknesses in the US economy. Recently, national debt grew much faster than the economy for the third quarter in a row, just one of many warning signs concerning legendary investors. Our guest commentator explains just how much the government is spending to make the economy seem strong, even as the US remains in the midst of a “private sector recession.
Over the past year, economist Daniel Lacalle has repeatedly warned that the United States is in the midst of a “private sector recession” and that official GDP measures are being propped up by government spending. The latest GDP numbers from the federal government strongly suggest he is right.
Today, the federal government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis released its revised estimate for GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2023. According to the report, total GDP increased $334.5 billion (quarter over quarter) during the fourth quarter. That’s down from the third quarter’s quarter-over-quarter increase of $547.1 billion, but is nonetheless an ostensibly robust rate of growth.
Yet, if we compare GDP growth during the fourth quarter to growth in the total national debt, we find that the numbers don’t look quite so robust after all. While GDP may have grown by $334 billion during the period, the national debt grew by more than twice as much: $834 billion. In other words, for every dollar of GDP growth, the national debt grew by 2.7 dollars.
Moreover, this is the third quarter in a row during which debt growth has substantially outpaced GDP growth. During the third quarter, the federal debt grew $1.5 dollars for every dollar of GDP growth. During the first quarter, the debt grew 3.5 dollars for every dollar of GDP growth.
The fact that this has now happened three quarters in a row is notable as well. Over the past fifty years, it is rare to find debt growth exceeding GDP growth for more than two quarters in a row except during periods of economic weakness when the federal government relies on monetary expansion and federal spending to “stimulate” economic growth. For example, we find a three-quarter streak during the Great Recession and the years immediately afterward—when job growth was extremely weak. The same can also be seen in the quarters following the 2001 recession.
This isn’t shocking. If the federal government is trying to boost GDP numbers through “stimulus” it will both spend freely and expand the money supply as the central bank purchases Treasuries to avoid a surge in interest rates. (See more on how the central bank enables deficit spending.) The current reliance on federal deficit spending to keep up the appearance of GDP growth further backs up Lacalle’s theory that the United States is in the midst of both a public-sector expansion and a private-sector contraction. That is, the private sector is experiencing many recessionary trends, such as falling real wages, a decline in manufacturing, and growing bankruptcies. Meanwhile, however, government spending is booming, so sectors of the economy that are closely tied to government spending continue to expand. In aggregate, total GDP numbers thus show an increase, even as the private sector stagnates.
After all, it’s important to keep in mind that GDP measures include government spending, and will also include the consumption that results from additional government spending on welfare programs, weapons manufacturing, and more. As the federal government spends its deficit-financed dollars, the recipients of these dollars consume more, thus pushing up current GDP.
The general problem with this trend can be seen if we apply it to a private firm. Imagine, for instance, that a private firm managed to increase its production by a million dollars, but at the same time took on an additional $2.5 million in debt to buy new sports cars for its least productive employees. Even worse, this new debt is in addition to a huge existing debt load.
This sort of debt should never be confused with good debt, which is debt taken on to fund new capital goods. That could potentially increase productivity later on. Government debit never good debt, however, because it is taken on for purposes of immediate consumption—usually on social welfare benefits or on bombing faraway countries.
Unfortunately, as we find debt growth repeatedly top GDP growth, we are likely to see more of this phenomenon moving forward. The federal debt is now larger than the entire GDP of the United States, and the gap between debt and GDP in each year has now widened to more than six trillion dollars. As this trend continues, expect to see deficit spending play a larger and larger role in GDP.
Two Storms, One Harvest
Every food crisis in living memory has been a one-shock event. The 2008 price spike was a commodity bubble. The 2020 shortages were a logistics failure. The 2022 grain scare was a war on one exporter’s ports. Each time, the system bent, adjusted, and recovered, and each time the experts assured us afterward that global markets are simply too big and too diversified to fail.
What nobody in Washington seems eager to discuss is that 2026 is shaping up to be something the modern food system has never actually faced. Two independent shocks, one climatic and one geopolitical, are converging on the same harvest cycle at the same time. Not sequentially. Simultaneously.
Start with the weather. The Pacific Ocean is currently building toward what forecasters now openly call a record event. NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center puts the odds of at least a strong El Niño near 88 percent, with roughly two in three odds it reaches “very strong” status, the tier reserved for perhaps three or four events in the entire satellite era. Every major global model now projects a median peak in Super El Niño territory, and most of them project it exceeding the 2015-16 event, which until now held the modern record. Sea surface anomalies were already brushing the super threshold in mid-July, months before these events normally peak. The atmosphere has already shifted into El Niño mode, and the event is forecast to crest in late fall and early winter.
This is not about “climate change.” It’s about the standard cycles of weather, and the cycle we’re currently in is one that has likely devastated societies in the past. We’re better prepared as a society today, but not all Americans are equally prepared.
Serious households have started doing the quiet math on their own. Grocery bills tell part of the story, and the forecast maps tell the rest, which is why long-term food storage has moved from fringe hobby to mainstream line item in the family budget, with established suppliers like Heaven’s Harvest seeing demand from people who five years ago would have rolled their eyes at the idea. That instinct is not paranoia. It is pattern recognition, and the pattern is worth walking through carefully.
Editor’s Note: Heaven’s Harvest IS a sponsor, but the warnings of this article are real and would be written even if we didn’t have a survival food sponsor. With that said, those who take advantage of what they offer can use promo code “Patriot” for 15% off.
The Fertilizer Clock Is Already Running
While the Pacific warms, the second shock has been unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz. The conflict with Iran turned the world’s most important energy chokepoint into a contested waterway, and the consequences reach far beyond the gas pump. Roughly a third of global fertilizer trade moves through Hormuz, and the disruption sent urea prices up 86 percent year over year by March, with a 53 percent jump in a single month.
The World Bank projects energy prices rising about 24 percent in 2026 and fertilizer about 31 percent. By its own accounting, fertilizer prices ran 35 percent higher in the first five months of this year than the same period last year.
Here is the mechanism the nightly news will not explain. Fertilizer is not a grocery item. It is a time-delayed input. The nitrogen a farmer in Iowa or Punjab could not afford to apply this spring does not show up as a problem this spring. It shows up as a thinner harvest six to twelve months later.
The World Bank’s own food security brief concedes that the effects of reduced applications earlier this season “are likely to become visible only later in harvest outcomes.” Translate that from institutional language into plain English and it means this. The damage is already done, it is already in the ground, and we are simply waiting for it to arrive on the shelf.
Now check the calendar. Six to twelve months from the spring planting season lands us squarely in late 2026 and early 2027. Which is precisely when the strongest El Niño in the instrumental record is forecast to peak, bringing its signature droughts to Southeast Asia, Australia, southern Africa, northern Brazil, and South Asia, the very regions that grow the world’s rice, sugar, and oilseeds.
The World Bank warns openly that a strong El Niño “could disrupt multiple crop belts simultaneously” on top of the conflict-driven input costs. Their baseline projection assumes the Middle East disruptions ease by autumn. What in the last two years of Middle East history suggests that assumption is safe?
The System Has No Slack Left
The comfortable answer is that global markets always adjust. But adjustment requires slack, and the slack is gone. Global cereal production is expected to decline from last year’s records even before El Niño does its work. The UN World Food Programme, hardly a den of right-wing preppers, is calling this the most significant disruption to its supply chains since Covid and the invasion of Ukraine, and its supply chain director put the stakes bluntly.
Today’s supply chain challenges are tomorrow’s hunger crisis.
There is also a political dimension that markets cannot price. When food gets scarce, governments do not behave like economists. They behave like politicians. Export bans, hoarding mandates, and panic buying at the national level turned the modest rice shortfall of 2008 into a global crisis, and analysts are already warning that import-dependent nations are the first dominoes.
The 2015-16 Super El Niño, a far weaker event than what is now forecast, threw tens of millions into food stress across Africa and Asia. This one is projected to be stronger, and it arrives with fertilizer already rationed by price and shipping lanes already contested by missiles.
What Joseph Knew
Scripture does not treat preparation for lean years as faithlessness. It treats it as wisdom delivered in advance to those willing to act on it.
Behold, there come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of Egypt: And there shall arise after them seven years of famine; and all the plenty shall be forgotten in the land of Egypt.
Joseph did not respond to that warning with a hashtag or a committee. He stored grain during the years of abundance, and when the famine came, Egypt stood while its neighbors begged. The lesson is not that famine is certain. It is that the time to prepare is precisely when preparation still looks optional.
Nobody who filled a pantry in a year of plenty has ever regretted it, and nobody standing in an empty aisle has ever been glad he waited for certainty.
None of this calls for panic, and panic is the enemy of sound judgment anyway. It calls for the same unglamorous prudence our grandparents considered ordinary. Keep some cash margin, know your local growers, and put real food in deep storage while it is cheap and available, because the entire arc of this story is that cheap and available is a closing window.
Families looking for a straightforward place to start can visit Heaven’s Harvest and use promo code Patriot for 15 percent off long-term storable food. The forecasts may yet soften, the strait may yet reopen, and we should pray they do. But hope is a fine thing to hold and a foolish thing to eat.
